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In previous work (Weatherson, 2005, 2011, 2012b) I’ve defended an interest-relative
theory of belief. is paper continues the defence. I have four aims.
1. To oﬀer a new kind of reason for being unsatisëed with the simple Lockean
reduction of belief to credence.
2. To defend the legitimacy of appealing to credences in a theory of belief.
3. To illustrate the importance of theoretical, as well as practical, interests in an
interest-relative account of belief.
4. To have another try at extending my basic account of belief to cover propositions
that are practically and theoretically irrelevant to the agent.
You’re probably familiar with the following dialectic. We want there to be some sys-
tematic connection between credences and beliefs. At ërst blush, saying that a person
believes p and has a very low credence in p isn’t just an accusation of irrationality, it is
literally incoherent. e simplest such connection would be a reduction of beliefs to
credences. But the simplest reductions don’t work.
If we identify beliefs with credence 1, and take credences to support betting dis-
positions, then a rational agent will have very few beliefs. ere are lots of things that
an agent, we would normally say, believes even though she wouldn’t bet on them at
absurd odds. Note that this argument doesn’t rely on reducing credences to betting
dispositions; as long as credences support the betting dispositions, the argument goes
through.
A simple retreat is to the so-calledLockean thesis, which holds that to believe that
p is to have credence in p greater than some threshold t , where t < 1. Just how the
threshold is determined could be a matter of some discretion. Perhaps it is a function
of the agent’s situation, or of the person ascribing beliefs to the agent, or to the person
evaluating that ascription. Never mind these complexities; assuming all such things
are held ëxed, the Lockean thesis says that there is a threshold t such that everything
with credence above t is believed.
ere’s a simple objection to the Lockean thesis. Given some very weak assump-
tions about the world, it implies that there are plenty of quadruples hS,A,B ,A^ Bi
such that
† I’ve discussed this paper with many people. I’m especially grateful to feedback from Jessica Brown,
Josh Dever, Ishani Maitra, Lisa Miracchi, Sarah Moss, Levi Spectre and Jacob Ross, and the audience at
the Rutgers Formal Epistemology Workshop/Epistemology Conference.
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 S is a rational agent.
 A,B and A^B are propositions.
 S believes A and believes B .
 S does not believe A^B .
 S knows that she has all these states, and consciously reìectively endorses them.
Now one might think, indeed I do think, that such quadruples do not exist at all.
But set that objection aside. If the Lockean is correct, these quadruples should be
everywhere. at’s because for any t 2 (0,1) you care to pick, quadruples of the form
hS,C ,D ,C ^Di are very very common.
 S is a rational agent.
 C ,D and C ^D are propositions.
 S ’s credence in C is greater than t , and her credence in D is greater than t .
 S ’s credence in C ^D is less than t .
 S knows that she has all these states, and reìectively endorses them.
e best arguments for the existence of quadruples hS,A,B ,A^Bi are non-constructive
existence proofs. David Christensen (2005) for instance, argues from the existence of
the preface paradox to the existence of these quadruples. I’ve expressed some reserva-
tions about that argument in the past (Weatherson, 2005). But what I want to stress
here is that even if these existence proofs work, they don’t really prove what the Lock-
ean needs. ey don’t show that quadruples satisfying the constraints we associated
with hS,A,B ,A^ Bi are just as common as quadruples satisfying the constraints we
associated with hS,C ,D,C ^ Di, for any t . But if the Lockean were correct, they
should be exactly as common.
is kind of consideration pushes some of us, well me in any case, towards an
interest-relative account of belief. But I’m going to set that move aside to start by in-
vestigating a diﬀerent objection. is objection holds that the Lockean thesis could
not be true, because credence 1 is not suﬃcient for belief. at is, the Lockean is
committed to the thesis known as regularity; that everything left open by belief gets
a positive credence. I think regularity is false. at’s hardly news, there are plenty
of good arguments against it, though most of these involve cases with some ideali-
sations. Timothy Williamson (2007a) has a compelling argument against regularity
turning on reìections about a case involving inënite coin ìips.1 I’m going to oﬀer a
1If there’s any gap in Williamson’s argument, it is I think at the point where he concludes that any
two inënite sequences of coin ìips have the same probability of landing all heads. I think that the
defender of non-numerical, comparative approaches to probability can deny that with some plausibility.
Perhaps the two sequences of coin ìips have incomparable probabilities of landing all heads. But this
leads us into complications that are irrlevant to this paper, especially since I think it turns out there is
a sound Williamsonian argument against the Lockean who lets diﬀerent sequences have incomparable
probabilities. For a more pessimistic take on Williamson’s argument, see Weintraub (2008).
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‘ënite’ argument against regularity, which I hope is of independent interest, and from
that conclude the Lockean is mistaken. ere is a worry that my argument against the
Lockean also undermines my preferred positive view, and I’ll suggest an independently
motivated patch. I’ll then turn to Richard Holton’s attack on the very notion of cre-
dence, which obviously would have repercussions for attempts to understand beliefs
in terms of credences were it to succeed. I think it doesn’t succeed, but it does show
there are important and underappreciated constraints on a theory of belief. I’ll con-
clude with a comparison between my preferred interest-relative account of belief, and
a recent account suggested by Jacob Ross and Mark Schroeder. e short version of
the comparison is that I think there’s less diﬀerence between the views than Ross and
Schroeder think, though naturally I think what diﬀerences there are favour my view.
1 Playing Games with a Lockean
I’m going to raise problems for Lockeans, and for defenders of regularity in general,
by discussing a simple game. e game itself is a nice illustration of how a number of
distinct solution concepts in game theory come apart. (Indeed, the use I’ll make of it
isn’t a million miles from the use that Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) make of it.) To
set the problem up, I need to say a few words about how I think of game theory. is
won’t be at all original - most of what I say is taken from important works by Robert
Stalnaker (1994, 1996, 1998, 1999). But it is diﬀerent to what I used to think, and
perhaps to what some other people think too, so I’ll set it out slowly.2
Start with a simple decision problem, where the agent has a choice between two
acts A1 and A2, and there are two possible states of the world, S1 and S2, and the agent
knows the payouts for each act-state pair are given by the following able.
S1 S2
A1 4 0
A2 1 1
What to do? I hope you share the intuition that it is radically underdetermined by
the information I’ve given you so far. If S2 is much more probable than S1, then A2
should be chosen; otherwise A1 should be chosen. But I haven’t said anything about
the relative probability of those two states. Now compare that to a simple game. Row
has two choices, which I’ll call A1 and A2. Column also has two choices, which I’ll call
S1 and S2. It is common knowledge that each player is rational, and that the payouts
for the pairs of choices are given in the following table. (As always, Row’s payouts are
given ërst.)
2I’m grateful to the participants in a game theory seminar at Arché in 2011, especially Josh Dever and
Levi Spectre, for very helpful discussions that helped me see through my previous confusions.
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S1 S2
A1 4, 0 0, 1
A2 1, 0 1, 1
What should Row do? is one is easy. Column gets 1 for sure if she plays S2, and 0
for sure if she plays S1. So she’ll play S2. And given that she’s playing S2, it is best for
Row to play A2.
You probably noticed that the game is just a version of the decision problem that
we discussed a couple of paragraphs ago. e relevant states of the world are choices
of Column. But that’s ëne; we didn’t say in setting out the decision problem what
constituted the states S1 and S2. And note that we solved the problem without ex-
plicitly saying anything about probabilities. What we added was some information
about Column’s payouts, and the fact that Column is rational. From there we de-
duced something about Column’s play, namely that she would play S2. And from that
we concluded what Row should do.
ere’s something quite general about this example. What’s distinctive about game
theory isn’t that it involves any special kinds of decision making. Once we get the
probabilities of each move by the other player, what’s left is (mostly) expected utility
maximisation. (We’ll come back to whether the ‘mostly’ qualiëcation is needed below.)
e distinctive thing about game theory is that the probabilities aren’t speciëed in the
setup of the game; rather, they are solved for. Apart from special cases, such as where
one option strictly dominates another, we can’t say much about a decision problem
with unspeciëed probabilities. But we can and do say a lot about games where the
setup of the game doesn’t specify the probabilities, because we can solve for them given
the other information we have.
is way of thinking about games makes the description of game theory as ‘in-
teractive epistemology’ (Aumann, 1999) rather apt. e theorist’s work is to solve for
what a rational agent should think other rational agents in the game should do. From
this perspective, it isn’t surprising that game theory will make heavy use of equilibrium
concepts. In solving a game, we must deploy a theory of rationality, and attribute
that theory to rational actors in the game itself. In eﬀect, we are treating rationality
as something of an unknown, but one that occurs in every equation we have to work
with. Not surprisingly, there are going to be multiple solutions to the puzzles we face.
is way of thinking lends itself to an epistemological interpretation of one of the
most puzzling concepts in game theory, the mixed strategy. Arguably the core solution
concept in game theory is the Nash equilibrium. As you probably know, a set of moves
is a Nash equilibrium if no player can improve their outcome by deviating from the
equilibrium, conditional on no other player deviating. In many simple games, the only
Nash equilibria involve mixed strategies. Here’s one simple example.
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S1 S2
A1 0, 1 10, 0
A2 9, 0 -1, 1
is game is reminiscent of some puzzles that have beenmuch discussed in the decision
theory literature, namely asymmetric Death inDamascus puzzles. Here Columnwants
herself and Row to make the ‘same’ choice, i.e., A1 and S1 or A2 and S2. She gets 1 if
they do, 0 otherwise. And Row wants them to make diﬀerent choices, and gets 10 if
they do. Row also dislikes playing A2, and this costs her 1 whatever else happens. It
isn’t too hard to prove that the only Nash equilibrium for this game is that Row plays
a mixed strategy playing both A1 and A2 with probability 1/2, while Column plays the
mixed strategy that gives S1 probability 11/20, and S2 with probability 9/20.
Now what is a mixed strategy? It is easy enough to take away form the standard
game theory textbooks a metaphysical interpretation of what a mixed strategy is.
Here, for instance, is the paragraph introducing mixed strategies in Dixit and Skeath’s
Games of Strategy.
When players choose to act unsystematically, they pick from among their
pure strategies in some randomway…We call a randommixture between
these two pure strategies a mixed strategy. (Dixit and Skeath, 2004, 186)
Dixit and Skeath are saying that it is deënitive of a mixed strategy that players use some
kind of randomisation device to pick their plays on any particular run of a game. at
is, the probabilities in a mixed strategy must be in the world; they must go into the
players’ choice of play. at’s one way, the paradigm way really, that we can think of
mixed strategies metaphysically.
But the understanding of game theory as interactive epistemology naturally sug-
gests an epistemological interpretation of mixed strategies.
One could easily …[model players] …turning the choice over to a ran-
domizing device, but while it might be harmless to permit this, players
satisfying the cognitive idealizations that game theory and decision theory
make could have no motive for playing a mixed strategy. So how are we to
understand Nash equilibrium in model theoretic terms as a solution con-
cept? We should follow the suggestion of Bayesian game theorists, inter-
preting mixed strategy proëles as representations, not of players’ choices,
but of their beliefs. (Stalnaker, 1994, 57-8)
Games, Beliefs and Credences 6
One nice advantage of the epistemological interpretation, as noted by Binmore (2007,
185) is that we don’t require players to have n-sided dice in their satchels, for every n,
every time they play a game.3 But another advantage is that it lets us make sense of
the diﬀerence between playing a pure strategy and playing a mixed strategy where one
of the ‘parts’ of the mixture is played with probability one.
With that in mind, consider the below game, which I’ll call R-G. I’ve said
something diﬀerent about this game in earlier work (Weatherson, 2012a). But I now
think that to understand what’s going on, we need to think about mixed strategies
where one element of the mixture has probability one.
Informally, in this game A and B must each play either a green or red card. I
will capitalise A’s moves, i.e., A can play GREEN or RED, and italicise B ’s moves,
i.e., B can play green or red. If two green cards, or one green card and one red card
are played, each player gets $1. If two red cards are played, each gets nothing. Each
cares just about their own wealth, so getting $1 is worth 1 util. All of this is common
knowledge. More formally, here is the game table, with A on the row and B on the
column.
green red
GREEN 1, 1 1, 1
RED 1, 1 0, 0
When I write game tables like this, and I think this is the usual way game tables are
to be interpreted (Weatherson, 2012b), I mean that the players know that these are
the payouts, that the players know the other players to be rational, and these pieces of
knowledge are common knowledge to at least as many iterations as needed to solve the
game. With that in mind, let’s think about how the agents should approach this game.
I’m going to make one big simplifying assumption at ërst. We’ll relax this later,
but it will help the discussion to start with this assumption. is assumption is that the
doctrine of Uniqueness applies here; there is precisely one rational credence to have
in any salient proposition about how the game will play. Some philosophers think that
Uniqueness always holds (White, 2005). I join with those such as North (2010) and
Schoenëeld (forthcoming) who don’t. But it does seem like Uniqueness might often
hold; there might often be a right answer to a particular problem. Anyway, I’m going
to start by assuming that it does hold here.
e ërst thing to note about the game is that it is symmetric. So the probability
of A playing GREEN should be the same as the probability of B playing green, since
3Actually, I guess it is worse than if some games have the only equilibria involving mixed strategies
with irrational probabilities. And it might be noted that Binmore’s introduction of mixed strategies, on
page 44 of his (2007), sounds much more like the metaphysical interpretation. But I think the later
discussion is meant to indicate that this is just a heuristic introduction; the epistemological interpretation
is the correct one.
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A and B face exactly the same problem. Call this common probability x . If x < 1, we
get a quick contradiction. e expected value, to Row, of GREEN, is 1. Indeed, the
known value of GREEN is 1. If the probability of green is x, then the expected value
of RED is x. So if x < 1, and Row is rational, she’ll deënitely play GREEN. But that’s
inconsistent with the claim that x < 1, since that means that it isn’t deënite that Row
will play GREEN.
So we can conclude that x = 1. Does that mean we can know that Row will play
GREEN? No. Assume we could conclude that. Whatever reason we would have for
concluding that would be a reason for any rational person to conclude that Column
will play green. Since any rational person can conclude this, Row can conclude it. So
Row knows that she’ll get 1 whether she plays GREEN or RED. But then she should
be indiﬀerent between playing GREEN and RED. And if we know she’s indiﬀerent
between playing GREEN and RED, and our only evidence for what she’ll play is that
she’s a rational player who’ll maximise her returns, then we can’t be in a position to
know she’ll play GREEN.
I think the arguments of the last two paragraphs are sound. We’ll turn to an ob-
jection presently, but let’s note how bizarre is the conclusion we’ve reached. One ar-
gument has shown that it could not be more probable that Row will play GREEN. A
second argument has shown that we can’t know that Row will play GREEN. It reminds
me of examples involving blindspots (Sorensen, 1988). Consider this case:
(B) Brian does not know (B).
at’s true, right? Assume it’s false, so I do know (B). Knowledge is factive, so (B) is
true. But that contradicts the assumption that it’s false. So it’s true. But I obviously
don’t know that it’s true; that’s what this very true proposition says.4
Now I’m not going to rest anything on this case, because there are so many tricky
things one can say about blindspots, and about the paradoxes generally. It does suggest
that there are other ënite cases where one can properly have maximal credence in a
true proposition without knowledge.5 And, assuming that we shouldn’t believe things
we know we don’t know, that means we can have maximal credence in things we don’t
4It’s received wisdom in philosophy that one can never properly say something of the form p, but I
don’t know that p. is is used as a data point in views as far removed from each other as those defended in
Heal (1994) and Williamson (1996). But I don’t feel the force of this alleged datum at all, and (B) is just
one reason. For a diﬀerent kind of case that makes the same point, see Maitra and Weatherson (2010).
5As an aside, the existence of these cases is why I get so irritated when epistemologists try to theorise
about ‘Gettier Cases’ as a class. What does (B) have in commonwith inferences from a justiëed false belief,
or with otherwise sound reasoning that is ever so close to issuing in a false conclusion due to relatively
bad luck? As far as I can tell, the class of justiëed true beliefs that aren’t knowledge is a disjunctive mess,
and this should matter for thinking about the nature of knowledge. For further examples, see Williamson
(2013) and Nagel (2013).
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believe. All I want to point out is that this phenomena of maximal credence without
knowledge, and presumably without full belief, isn’t a quirky feature of self-reference,
or of games, or of puzzles about inënity; it comes up in a wide range of cases.
For the rest of this section I want to reply to one objection, and weaken an assump-
tion I made earlier. e objection is that I’m wrong to assume that agents will only
maximise expected utility. ey may have tie-breaker rules, and those rules might un-
dermine the arguments I gave above. e assumption is that there’s a uniquely rational
credence to have in any given situation.
I argued that if we knew that A would play GREEN, we could show that A had
no reason to play GREEN. But actually what we showed was that the expected utility
of playing GREEN would be the same as playing RED. Perhaps A has a reason to play
GREEN, namely that GREENweakly dominates RED. After all, there’s one possibility
on the table where GREEN does better than RED, and none where RED does better.
And perhaps that’s a reason, even if it isn’t a reason that expected utility considerations
are sensitive to.
Now I don’t want to insist on expected utility maximisation as the only rule for
rational decision making. Sometimes, I think some kind of tie-breaker procedure is
part of rationality. In the papers by Stalnaker I mentioned above, he often appeals to
this kind of weak dominance reasoning to resolve various hard cases. But I don’t think
weak dominance provides a reason to play GREEN in this particular case. When
Stalnaker says that agents should use weak dominance reasoning, it is always in the
context of games where the agents’ attitude towards the game matrix is diﬀerent to
their attitude towards each other. One case that Stalnaker discusses in detail is where
the game table is common knowledge, but there is merely common (justiëed, true)
belief in common rationality. Given such a diﬀerence in attitudes, it does seem there’s
a good sense in which the most salient departure from equilibrium will be one in which
the players end up somewhere else on the table. And given that, weak dominance
reasoning seems appropriate.
But that’s not what we’ve got here. Assuming that rationality requires playing
GREEN/green, the players know we’ll end up in the top left corner of the table. ere’s
no chance that we’ll end up elsewhere. Or, perhaps better, there is just as much chance
we’ll end up ‘oﬀ the table’, as that we’ll end up in a non-equilibrium point on the table.
To make this more vivid, consider the ‘possibility’ that B will play blue, and if B plays
blue, A will receive 2 if she plays RED, and -1 if she plays GREEN. Well hold on,
you might think, didn’t I say that green and red were the only options, and this was
common knowledge? Well, yes, I did, but if the exercise is to consider what would
happen if something the agent knows to be true doesn’t obtain, then the possibility
that one agent will play blue certainly seems like one worth considering. It is, after all,
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a metaphysical possibility. And if we take it seriously, then it isn’t true that under any
possible play of the game, GREEN does better than RED.
We can put this as a dilemma. Assume, for reductio, that GREEN/green is the only
rational play. en if we restrict our attention to possibilities that are epistemically
open to A, then GREEN does just as well as RED; they both get 1 in every possibility.
If we allow possibilities that are epistemically closed to A, then the possibility where B
plays blue is just as relevant as the possibility that B is irrational. After all, we stipulated
that this is a case where rationality is common knowledge. In neither case does the weak
dominance reasoning get any purchase.
With that in mind, we can see why we don’t need the assumption of Uniqueness.
Let’s play through how a failure of Uniqueness could undermine the argument. As-
sume, again for reductio, that we have credence " > 0 that A will play RED. Since
A maximises expected utility, that means A must have credence 1 that B will play
green. But this is already odd. Even if you think people can have diﬀerent reactions
to the same evidence, it is odd to think that one rational agent could regard a possi-
bility as inënitely less likely than another, given isomorphic evidence. And that’s not
all of the problems. Even if A has credence 1 that B will play green, it isn’t obvious
that playing RED is rational. After all, relative to the space of epistemic possibilities,
GREEN weakly dominates RED. Remember that we’re no longer assuming that it can
be known what A or B will play. So even without Uniqueness, there are two reasons
to think that it is wrong to have credence " > 0 that A will play RED. So we’ve still
shown that credence 1 doesn’t imply knowledge, and since the proof is known to us,
and full belief is incompatible with knowing that you can’t know, this is a case where
credence 1 doesn’t imply full belief. So whether A plays GREEN, like whether the
coin will ever land tails, is a case the Lockean cannot get right. No matter where they
set the threshold for belief our credence is above that threshold, but we don’t believe.
So I think this case is a real problem for a Lockean view about the relationship
between credence and belief. If A is rational, she can have credence 1 that B will play
green, but won’t believe that B will play green. But now you might worry that my own
account of the relationship between belief and credence is in just as much trouble.
After all, I said that to believe p is, roughly, to have the same attitudes towards all
salient questions as you have conditional on p . And it’s hard to identify a question
that rational A would answer diﬀerently upon conditionalising on the proposition that
B plays green.
I think what went wrong in my earlier view was that I’d too quickly equated updat-
ing with conditionalisation. e two can come apart. Here’s an example from Gillies
(2010) that makes the point well.6
6A similar example is in Kratzer (2012, 94).
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I have lost my marbles. I know that just one of them – Red or Yellow – is
in the box. But I don’t know which. I ënd myself saying things like …“If
Yellow isn’t in the box, the Red must be.” (4:13)
As Gillies goes on to point out, this isn’t really a problem for the Ramsey test view of
conditionals.
e Ramsey test – the schoolyard version, anyway – is a test for when
an indicative conditional is acceptable given your beliefs. It says that (if
p)(q) is acceptable in belief state B iﬀ q is acceptable in the derived or
subordinate state B-plus-the-information-that-p. (4:27)
And he notes that this can explain what goes on with the marbles conditional. Add
the information that Yellow isn’t in the box, and it isn’t just true, but must be true, that
Red is in the box.
Note though that while we can explain this conditional using the Ramsey test, we
can’t explain it using any version of the idea that probabilities of conditionals are con-
ditional probabilities. e probability that Redmust be in the box is 0. e probability
that Yellow isn’t in the box is not 0. So conditional on Yellow not being in the box,
the probability that Red must be in the box is still 0. Yet the conditional is perfectly
assertable.
ere is, and this is Gillies’s key point, something about the behaviour of modals in
the consequents of conditionals that we can’t capture using conditional probabilities,
or indeed many other standard tools. And what goes for consequents of conditionals
goes for updated beliefs too. Learn that Yellow isn’t in the box, and you’ll conclude
that Red must be. But that learning can’t go via conditionalisation; just conditionalise
on the new information and the probability that Red must be in the box goes from 0
to 0.
Now it’s a hard problem to say exactly how this alternative to updating by condi-
tionalisation should work. But very roughly, the idea is that at least some of the time,
we update by eliminating worlds from the space of possibilities. is aﬀects dramati-
cally the probability of propositions whose truth is sensitive to which worlds are in the
space of possibiilties.
For example, in the game I’ve been discussing, we should believe that rational B
might play red. Indeed, the probability of that is, I think, 1. And whether or not B
might play red is highly salient; it matters to the probability of whether A will play
GREEN or RED. Conditionalising on something that has probability 1, such as that
B will play green, can hardly change that probability. But updating on the proposition
that B will play green can make a diﬀerence. We can see that by simply noting that the
conditional If B plays green, she might play red is incoherent.
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So I conclude that a theory of belief like mine can handle the puzzle this game
poses, as long as it distinguishes between conditionalising and updating, in just the
way Gillies suggests. To believe that p is to be disposed to not change any attitude
towards a salient question on updating that p. (Plus some bells and whistles to deal with
propositions that are not relevant to salient questions. We’ll return to them below.)
Updating often goes by conditionalisation, so we can often say that belief means having
attitudes that match unconditionally and conditionally on p. But not all updating
works that way, and the theory of belief needs to acknowledge this.
2 Holton on Credence
While I don’t agree with the Lockeans, I do endorse a lot of similar theses to them
about the relationship between belief and credence. ese theses include that both
beliefs and credences exist and that the two are constitutively (as opposed to merely
causally) connected. I diﬀer from the Lockeans in holding that both belief and cre-
dence have important explanatory roles, and that the connection between the two goes
via the interests of the agent. As with most work in this area, my views start oﬀ from
considerations of cases much like DeRose’s famous bank cases.7 Here’s another con-
tribution to the genre. I know it’s an overcrowded ëeld, but I wanted a case that (a) is
pretty realistic, and (b) doesn’t involve the attribution (either to oneself or others) of a
propositional attitude. In the example, X and Y are parents of a child, Z.
Y: is salad you bought is very good. Does it have nuts in it?
X: No. e nuttiness you’re tasting is probably from the beans.
Y: Oh, so we could pack it for Z’s lunch tomorrow.
X: Hang on, I better check about the nuts. Z’s pre-school is very fussy
about nuts. One of the children there might have an allergy, and it would
be awful to get in trouble over her lunch.
Here’s what I think is going on in that exchange.8 At t2 (I’ll use ti for the time of the
i ’th utterance in the exchange), X believes that the salad has no nuts in it. Indeed, the
one word sentence “No” expresses that belief. But by t4, X has lost that belief. It would
be ëne to pack the salad for lunch if it has no nuts, but X isn’t willing to do this for
the simple reason that X no longer believes that it has no nuts. Moreover, this change
of belief was, or at least could have been for all we’ve said so far, rational on X’s part.
7e idea of using allergies to illustrate the kind of case we’re interested in is due to Ross and Schroeder
(fort), and I’m grateful for the idea. It makes the intuitions much more vivid. e kind of cases we’re
considering play a big role in, inter alia, DeRose (1992); Cohen (1999) and Fantl and McGrath (2002).
8What I say here obviously has some similarities to a view put forward by Jennifer Nagel (2008), but
I ultimately end up drawing rather diﬀerent conclusions to the ones she draws.
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ere’s something a little puzzling about that. Jacob Ross and Mark Schroeder
(fort) voice a common intuition when they say that beliefs should only change when
new evidence comes in. Indeed, they use this intuition as a key argument against my
view of belief. But X doesn’t get any evidence that bears on the nuttiness of the salad.
Yet X rationally changes beliefs. So I just conclude that sometimes we can change
beliefs without new evidence coming in; sometimes our interests, broadly construed,
change, and that is enough to change beliefs.
We’ll come back to Ross and Schroeder’s arguments in the next section, because
ërst I want to concede something to the view that only evidence changes beliefs. at
view is false, but there might be a true view in the area. And that’s the view that only
change in evidence can change credences. But that view only makes sense if there are
such things as credences, and that’s something that Richard Holton (forthcoming) has
recently launched an intriguing argument against.
Holton’s broader project is a much more sweeping attack on the Lockean thesis
than I have proposed. Actually, it is a pair of more sweeping attacks. One of the pair
is that the Lockeans identify something that exists, namely belief, with something that
doesn’t, namely high credence. I would not, could not, sign up for that critique. But I
am much more sympathetic to the other attack in the pair, namely that credences and
beliefs have very diﬀerent dynamics.
Credences are, by their nature, exceedingly unstable. Whether an agent’s credence
that p is above or below any number x is liable to change according to any number
of possible changes in evidence. But, at least if the agent is rational, beliefs are not so
susceptible to change. Holton thinks that rational agents, or at least rational humans,
frequently instantiate the following pattern. ey form a belief that p , on excellent
grounds. ey later get some evidence that :p. e evidence is strong enough that,
had they had it to begin with, they would have remained uncertain about p . But they
do not decide to reopen the investigation into whether p . ey hold on to their belief
that p , the matter having been previously decided.
Such an attitude might look like unprincipled dogmatism. But it need not be, I
think, as long as four criteria are met. (I think Holton agrees with these criteria.) One
is that the agent’s willingness to reopen the question of whether p must increase. She
must be more willing, in the light of yet more evidence against p , to consider whether
p is really true. A second is that, should the agent (irrationally) reopen the question
of whether p , she should not use the fact that she previously closed that question as
evidence. Once the genie is out of the box, only reasoning about p can get it back in.
A third is that the costs of the inquiry must be high enough to warrant putting it oﬀ.
If simply turning one’s head ëfteen degrees to the left will lead to acquiring evidence
that deënitively settles whether p , it is a little dogmatic to refuse to do so in the face
of evidence against one’s previously formed opinion that p. And ënally, the costs of
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being wrong about p must not be too high. X, in our little dialogue above, would be
terribly dogmatic if they didn’t reopen the question of whether the salad had nuts in
it, on being informed that this information was being used in a high stakes inquiry.
So beliefs should have a kind of resilience. Credences, if they exist, should not have
this kind of resilience. So this suggests that a simple reduction of belief to credence,
as the Lockeans suggest, cannot be right. You might worry that things are worse, that
no reduction of belief to credence can be compatible with the diﬀerence in resilience
between belief and credence. We’ll return to that point, because ërst I want to look at
Holton’s stronger claim: that there are no such things as credences.
Holton acknowledges, as of course he must, that we have probabilistic truth-
directed attitudes. We can imagine a person, call her Paula, who thinks it’s likely
that Richard III murdered his nephews, for instance. But Holton oﬀers several reasons
for thinking that in these probabilistic truth-directed attitudes, the probability goes in
the content, not in the attitude. at is, we should interpret Paula as believing the
probabilistic claim, Richard III probably murdered his nephews, and not as having
some graded attitude towards the simple proposition Richard III murdered his nephews.
More precisely, Holton thinks we should understand Paula’s explicit attitudes that way,
and that independent of having reason to think that agents explicitly have probabilis-
tic attitudes, there’s no good way to make sense of the claim that they implicitly have
probabilistic attitudes. So there’s no such thing as credences, as usually understood.
Or, at least, there’s no good sense to be made of the claim that there are credences.
In response, I want to make six points.
1. Holton is right about cases like Paula’s, and the possibility of iterating terms like
probably provides independent support for this view.
2. Beliefs like the one Paula has are odd; they seem to have very strange truth
conditions.
3. Our theory of mind needs some mechanism for explaining the relationship be-
tween conëdence and action.
4. e ‘explanatory gap’ here could be ëlled by positing a binary attitude is more
conídent that.
5. is binary attitude can do all the work that graded attitudes were posited to
do, and in a (historically sensitive) way saves the credences story.
6. Credences (or at least conëdences) can have a key role within a Holton-like story
about graded belief. ey can both explain why agents reconsider some beliefs,
and provide a standard of correctness for decisions to reconsider.
Let’s take those in order.
I’m not going to rehearse Holton’s argument for the ‘content view’: that in cases
like Paula’s the content of her attitude, and not the attitude itself, is probabilistic. But
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I do want to oﬀer one extra consideration in its favour. (I’m indebted here to work in
progress by my colleague Sarah Moss (2013), though I’m not sure she’d approve of this
conclusion.) As well as Paula, we can imagine a person Pip who isn’t sure that Paula
is right, but thinks she’s probably right. at is, Pip thinks that Richard III probably
probably murdered his nephews. It’s easy to make sense of Pip on the content view.
Modalities in propositions iterate smoothly; that’s what they are designed to do. But
it’s much harder to iterate attitudes. e possibility of cases like Pip suggests Holton
must be right about Paula’s case.
But Paula’s case is odd. Beliefs have truth conditions. What are the truth con-
ditions for Paula’s belief? On the one hand, it seems they must be sensitive to her
evidence. If she later acquires conclusive evidence that Richard III was framed, she
won’t think her earlier self had a false belief. But if we put the evidence into the con-
tent of the belief, we get the strange result that her belief can’t be preserved by uttering
the same words to herself over again. at is, if the content of Paula’s belief is Given
the evidence I have now, Richard III likely murdered his nephews, she can’t have the very
same belief tomorrow by retaining the thought Richard III likely murdered his nephews.
And she can’t have a belief with the same content as anyone else by the two of them
both thinking Richard III likely murdered his nephews. ose seem like unhappy con-
clusions, especially in the midst of a project that wants to emphasise the resiliency of
belief. So perhaps we should say, following Stephenson (2007) or MacFarlane (2011),
that the truth conditions of the belief are agent-relative. Or, if we’re unhappy with the
MacFarlane story, we might be pushed towards a kind of expressivism (perhaps a la
Yalcin (2011)), which isn’t quite like either the content view or the attitude view that
Holton discusses. I’m personally partial to the relativist view, but I don’t want to argue
for that here, just note that the content view raises some interesting problems, and that
natural solutions to them could in a way blur the boundaries between the content and
attitude views.
As Holton notes in his discussion of Brutus, when our conëdence in a propo-
sition changes, our actions will change. Paula gets a little evidence that Richard III
was framed, and her actions may change. Of course, not much of what we do in
everyday life is sensitive to facts about English royal history, but there may be some
eﬀects. Maybe she’ll be less inclined to speak up if the topic of the princes’ murder
comes up, or she’ll take a slightly more jaundiced view of Shakespeare’s play (compare
Friend (2003).) Holton says that these falling conëdences need not have all the precise
structure of credences. In particular, they may not have the topology of the interval
[0,1]. But lots of credence lovers think that’s too demanding. ere’s a long tradition
of thinking that credences need not all be comparable.9 What’s important is that the
relative conëdences exist, and that they have a robust relationship to action.
9Notable members of the tradition include Levi (1974), Jeﬀrey (1983) and van Fraassen (1989).
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ere’s an old fashioned way of doing this. e idea is implicit in Ramsey (1926),
and made central in DeFinetti (1964). Take the binary attitude is more conídent that p
than q as primitive. As Holton notes, surface structure of our attitude reports suggest
that this attitude, unlike the graded attitude of credence, is part of folk psychology.
Lay down some constraints on this attitude. To get enough constraints that the binary
relation determines a unique probability function, the constraints will have to be very
tight. In particular, you’ll need some kind of Archimedean principle, and a principle
of universal comparability. ose aren’t very plausible, especially the second. But even
weaker constraints will get you something interesting. In particular, it isn’t hard to lay
down enough constraints that there is a unique set S of probability functions such that
the agent is more conëdent that p than q just in case Pr(p) > Pr(q) for all Pr 2 S .
(For much more detail, see for instance Walley (1991).)
In that way, we can derive credences from the relative conëdences of a reasonably
coherent agent. But we can do with even less coherence than that I think. A throwaway
remark from Ramsey (1929) provides a key clue. What is it to have credence 2=3 in
p? Don’t say it’s a betting disposition; mental states and behavioural dispositions aren’t
that tightly linked. Here’s Ramsey’s idea. To have credence 2=3 in p is to be exactly as
conëdent in p as in q _ r , where q , r and s are taken to be exclusive and exhaustive,
and one has equal conëdence in all three. It’s easy to see how to extend that to a
deënition of credence m=n for any integer m,n. It’s a little trickier to say precisely
what, say, credence 1= is, but rational credences are probably credences enough to
explain action. And just like that, we have a way of talking about credences, i.e.,
graded attitudes, without positing anything more than a binary attitudemore conídent
than.
Perhaps Holton could argue that we only have unary attitudes, not binary attitudes
like more conídent than. If Maury is more conëdent that Oswald shot JFK than that
Richard III murdered his nephews, that means he really believes the proposition It is
more likely that Oswald shot JFK than that Richard III murdered his nephews. But such
a view seems forced at best, and isn’t motivated by Holton’s other arguments for the
‘content view’. is attitude of more conídent than isn’t iterable. It isn’t subject to the
particular kind of reasoning errors that Holton takes to be evidence for the content
view in the probabilistic case. It is an attitude we ordinarily report as a binary attitude
in normal speech. In short, it looks like a genuine binary attitude.
Given that the binary attitude exists, and that we can deëne numerical (at least
rational) credences in terms of it, I’d say that’s enough to say that credences exist. In a
sense, credences will be epiphenomenal. What does the explanatory work is the binary
relation more conídent that. Maury might stay away from a showing of Richard III be-
cause he is less conëdent that it is historically accurate than he used to be. We can work
out from Maury’s other relative conëdences what his credence in Richard III’s guilt is
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and was. Or, at least, we can work out bounds on these. But those numbers aren’t in a
fundamental sense explanatory, and neither are the complicated sets of relative conë-
dences that constitute the numbers. What’s really explanatory are relative conëdences.
But it’s a harmless enough mode of speech to talk as if credences are explanatory; they
are easier to talk about than the underlying relative conëdences.
3 The Power of Theoretical Interests
So I think we should accept that credences exist. And we can just about reduce beliefs
to credences. In previous work I argued that we could do such a reduction. I’m not
altogether sure whether the amendments to that view I’m proposing here means it
no longer should count as a reductive view; we’ll come back to that question in the
conclusion.
e view I defended in previous work is that the reduction comes through the re-
lationship between conditional and unconditional attitudes. Very roughly, to believe
that p is simply to have the same attitudes, towards all salient questions, uncondition-
ally as you have conditional on p. In a syrupy slogan, belief means never having to
say you’ve conditionalised. For reasons I mentioned in section 1, I now think that was
inaccurate; I should have said that belief means never having to say you’ve updated, or
at least that you’ve updated your view on any salient question.
e restriction to salient questions is important. Consider any p that I normally
take for granted, but such that I wouldn’t bet on it at insane odds. I prefer declining
such a bet to taking it. But conditional on p, I prefer taking the bet. So that means I
don’t believe any such p. But just about any p satisëes that description, for at least some
‘insane’ odds. So I believe almost nothing. at would be a reductio of the position.
I respond by saying that the choice of whether to take an insane bet is not normally
salient.
But now there’s a worry that I’ve let in too much. For many p, there is no salient
decision that they even bear on. What I would do conditional on p, conditional on
:p , and unconditionally is exactly the same, over the space of salient choices. (And
this isn’t a case where updating and conditionalising come apart; I’ll leave this proviso
mostly implicit from now on.) So with the restriction in place, I believe p and :p .
at seems like a reductio of the view too. I probably do have inconsistent beliefs, but
not in virtue of p being irrelevant to me right now. I’ve changed my mind a little about
what the right way to avoid this problem is, in part because of some arguments by
Jacob Ross and Mark Schroeder.
ey have what looks like, on the surface, a rather diﬀerent view to mine. ey
say that to believe p is to have a default reasoning disposition to use p in reasoning.
Here’s how they describe their own view.
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What we should expect, therefore, is that for some propositions we would
have a defeasible or default disposition to treat them as true in our reasoning–
a disposition that can be overridden under circumstances where the cost
of mistakenly acting as if these propositions are true is particularly salient.
And this expectation is conërmed by our experience. We do indeed seem
to treat some uncertain propositions as true in our reasoning; we do in-
deed seem to treat them as true automatically, without ërst weighing the
costs and beneëts of so treating them; and yet in contexts such as High
where the costs of mistakenly treating them as true is salient, our natural
tendency to treat these propositions as true often seems to be overridden,
and instead we treat them as merely probable.
But if we concede that we have such defeasible dispositions to treat par-
ticular propositions as true in our reasoning, then a hypothesis naturally
arises, namely, that beliefs consist in or involve such dispositions. More
precisely, at least part of the functional role of belief is that believing that
p defeasibly disposes the believer to treat p as true in her reasoning. Let us
call this hypothesis the reasoning disposition account of belief. (Ross and
Schroeder, fort, 9-10)
ere are, relative to what I’m interested in, three striking characteristics of Ross and
Schroeder’s view.
1. Whether you believe p is sensitive to how you reason; that is, your theoretical
interests matter.
2. How you would reason about some questions that are not live is relevant to
whether you believe p.
3. Dispositions can be masked, so you can believe p even though you don’t actually
use p in reasoning now.
I think they take all three of these points to be reasons to favour their view over mine.
As I see it, we agree on point 1 (and I always had the resources to agree with them), I
can accommodate point 2 with a modiëcation to my theory, and point 3 is a cost of
their theory, not a beneët. Let’s take those points in order.
ere are lots of reasons to dislike what Ross and Schroeder call Pragmatic Credal
Reductionism (PCR). is is, more or less, the view that the salient questions, in the
sense relevant above, are just those which are practically relevant to the agent. So to
believe p just is to have the same attitude towards all practically relevant questions
unconditionally as conditional on p . ere are at least three reasons to resist this view.
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One reason comes from the discussions of Ned Block’s example Blockhead (Block,
1978). As Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson point out, the lesson to take from that ex-
ample is that beliefs are constituted in part by their relations to other mental states
(Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson, 2007, 114ﬀ). ere’s a quick attempted refutation of
PCR via the Blockhead case which doesn’t quite work. We might worry that if all that
matters to belief given PCR is how it relates to action, PCR will have the implausible
consequence that Blockhead has a rich set of beliefs. at isn’t right; PCR is com-
patible with the view that Blockhead doesn’t have credences, and hence doesn’t have
credences that constitute beliefs. But the Blockhead example’s value isn’t exhausted by
its use in quick refutations.10 e lesson is that beliefs are, by their nature, interactive.
It seems to me that PCR doesn’t really appreciate that lesson.
Another reason comes from recent work by Jessica Brown (forthcoming). Compare
these two situations.
1. S is in circumstances C, and has to decide whether to do X.
2. S is in completely diﬀerent circumstances to C, but is seriously engaged in plan-
ning for future contingencies. She’s currently trying to decide whether in cir-
cumstances C to do X.
Intuitively, S can bring exactly the same evidence, knowledge and beliefs to bear on the
two problems. If C is a particularly high stakes situation, say it is a situation where one
has to decide what to feed someone with a severe peanut allergy, then a lot of things
that can ordinarily be taken for granted cannot, in this case, be taken for granted. And
that’s true whether S is actually in C, or she is just planning for the possibility that she
ënds herself in C.
So I conclude that both practical and theoretical interests matter for what we can
take for granted in inquiry. e things we can take for granted into a theoretical inquiry
into what to do in high stakes contexts as restricted, just as they are when we are in a
high stakes context, and must make a practical decision. Since the latter restriction on
what we can take for granted is explained by (and possibly constituted by) a restriction
on what we actually believe in those contexts, we should similarly conclude that agents
simply believe less when they are reasoning about high stakes contexts, whatever their
actual context.
A third reason to dislike PCR comes from the ‘Renzi’ example in Ross and Schroeder’s
paper. I’ll run through a somewhat more abstract version of the case, because I don’t
think the details are particularly important. Start with a standard decision problem.
10e point I’m making here is relevant I think to recent debates about the proper way to formalise
counterexamples in philosophy, as in (Williamson, 2007b; Ichikawa and Jarvis, 2009; Malmgren, 2011).
I worry that too much of that debate is focussed on the role that examples play in one-step refutations.
But there’s more, much more, to a good example than that.
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e agent knows that X is better to do if p, and Y is better to do if :p. e agent
should then go through calculating the relative gains to doing X or Y in the situa-
tions they are better, and the probability of p. But the agent imagined doesn’t do that.
Rather, the agent divides the possibility space in four, taking the salient possibilities
to be p ^ q , p ^:q ,:p ^ q and :p ^:q , and then calculates the expected utility of
X and Y accordingly. is is a bad bit of reasoning on the agent’s part. In the cases
we are interested in, q is exceedingly likely. Moreover, the expected utility of each act
doesn’t change a lot depending on q’s truth value. So it is fairly obvious that we’ll end
up making the same decision whether we take the ‘small worlds’ in our decision model
to be just the world where p, and the world where :p , or the four worlds this agent
uses. But the agent does use these four, and the question is what to say about them.
Ross and Schroeder say that such an agent should not be counted as believing that
q. If they are consciously calculating the probability that q, and taking :q possibilities
into account when calculating expected utilities, they regard q as an open question.
And regarding q as open in this way is incompatible with believing it. I agree with all
this.
ey also think that PCR implies that the agent does believe q. e reason is that
conditionalising on q doesn’t change the agent’s beliefs about any practical question. I
think that’s right too, at least on a natural understanding of what ‘practical’ is.
My response to all these worries is to say that whether someone believes that p
depends not just on how conditionalising (or more generally updating) on p would
aﬀect someone’s action, but on how it would aﬀect their reasoning. at is, just as we
learned from the Blockhead example, to believe that p requires having a mental state
that is connected to the rest of one’s cognitive life in roughly the way a belief that p
should be connected. Let’s go through both the last two cases to see how this works
on my theory.
One of the things that happens when the stakes go up is that conditionalising on
very probable things can change the outcome of interesting decisions. Make the prob-
ability that some nice food is peanut-free be high, but short of one. Conditional on
it being peanut-free, it’s a good thing to give to a peanut-allergic guest. But uncon-
ditionally, it’s a bad thing to give to such a guest, because the niceness of the food
doesn’t outweigh the risk of killing them. And that’s true whether the guest is actually
there, or you’re just thinking about what to do should such a guest arrive in the future.
In general, the same questions will be relevant whether you’re in C trying to decide
whether to do X, or simply trying to decide whether to X in C. In one case they will be
practically relevant questions, in the other they will be theoretically relevant questions.
But this feels a lot like a distinction without a diﬀerence, since the agent should have
similar beliefs in the two cases.
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e same response works for Ross and Schroeder’s case. e agent was trying
to work out the expected utility of X and Y by working out the utility of each ac-
tion in each of four ‘small worlds’, then working out the probability of each of these.
Conditional on q, the probability of two of them (p ^:q ,:p ^:q), will be 0. Un-
conditionally, this probability won’t be 0. So the agent has a diﬀerent view on some
question they have taken an interest in unconditionally to their view conditional on q.
So they don’t believe q. e agent shouldn’t care about that question, and conditional
on each question they should care about, they have the same attitude unconditionally
and conditional on q. But they do care about these probabilistic questions, so they
don’t believe q.
So I think that Ross and Schroeder and I agree on point 1; something beyond
practical interests is relevant to belief.
ey have another case that I think does suggest a needed revision to my theory.
I’m going to modify their case a little to change the focus a little, and to avoid puzzles
about vagueness. (What follows is a version of their example about Dalí’s moustache,
purged of any worries about vagueness, and without the focus on consistency. I don’t
think the problem they true to press on me, that my theory allows excessive inconsis-
tency of belief among rational agents, really sticks. Everyone will have to make qual-
iëcations to consistency to deal with the preface paradox, and for reasons I went over
in (Weatherson, 2005), I think the qualiëcations I make are the best ones to make.)
LetD be the proposition that the number of games the Detroit Tigers won in 1976
(in the MLB regular season) is not a multiple of 3. At most times, D is completely
irrelevant to anything I care about, either practically or theoretically. My attitudes
towards any relevant question are the same unconditionally as conditional on D. So
there’s a worry that I’ll count as believing D, and believing :D , by default.
In earlier work, I added a clause meant to help with cases like this. I said that for
determining whether an agent believes that p, we should treat the question of whether
p’s probability is above or below 0.5 as salient, even if the agent doesn’t care about it.
Obviously this won’t help with this particular case. e probability of D is around 2/3,
and is certainly above 0.5. My ‘ëx’ avoids the consequence that I implausibly count as
believing :D . But I still count, almost as implausibly, as believing D. is needs to be
ëxed.
Here’s my proposed change. For an agent to count as believing p, it must be possi-
ble for p to do some work for them in reasoning. Here’s what I mean by work. Consider
a very abstract set up of a decision problem, as follows.
p q
X 4 1
Y 3 2
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at table encodes a lot of information. It encodes that p _ q is true; otherwise
there are some columns missing. It encodes that the only live choices are X or Y;
otherwise there are rows missing. It encodes that doing X is better than doing Y if p,
and worse if q.
For any agent, and any decision problem, there is a table like this that they would
be disposed to use to resolve that problem. Or, perhaps, there are a series of tables and
there is no fact about which of them they would be most disposed to use.
Given all that terminology, here’s my extra constraint on belief. To believe that p,
there must be some decision problem such that some table the agent would be disposed
to use to solve it encodes that p. If there is no such problem, the agent does not believe
that p. For anything that I intuitively believe, this is an easy condition to satisfy. Let
the problem be whether to take a bet that pays 1 if p, and loses 1 otherwise. Here’s the
table I’d be disposed to use to solve the problem.
p
Take bet 1
Decline bet 0
is table encodes that p, so it is suﬃcient to count as believing that p. And it doesn’t
matter that this bet isn’t on the table. I’m disposed to use this table, so that’s all that
matters.
But might there be problems in the other direction. What about an agent who, if
oﬀered such a bet on D, would use such a simple table? I simply say that they believe
that D. I would not use any such table. I’d use this table.
D :D
Take bet 1 –1
Decline bet 0 0
Now given the probability ofD, I’d still end up taking the bet; it has an expected return
of 2/3. (Well, actually I’d probably decline the bet because being oﬀered the bet would
change the probability of D for reasons made clear in Runyon (1992, 14–15). But
that hardly undermines the point I’m making.) But this isn’t some analytic fact about
me, or even I think some respect in which I’m obeying the dictates of rationality. It’s
simply a fact that I wouldn’t take D for granted in any inquiry. And that’s what my
non-belief that D consists in.
is way of responding to the Tigers example helps respond to a nice observation
that Ross and Schroeder make about correctness. A belief that p is, in some sense,
incorrect if :p . It isn’t altogether clear how to capture this sense given a simple reduc-
tion of beliefs to credences. I propose to capture it using this idea that decision tables
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encode propositions. A table is incorrect if it encodes something that’s false. To believe
something is, inter alia, to be disposed to use a table that encodes it. So if it is false, it
involves a disposition to do something incorrect.
It also helps capture Holton’s observation that beliefs should be resilient. If some-
one is disposed to use decision tables that encode that p, that disposition should be
fairly resilient. And to the extent that it is resilient, they will satisfy all the other clauses
in my preferred account of belief. So anyone who believes p should have a resilient
belief that p.
e last point is where I think my biggest disagreement with Ross and Schroeder
lies. ey think it is very important that a theory of belief vindicate a principle they
call Stability.
Stability: A fully rational agent does not change her beliefs purely in
virtue of an evidentially irrelevant change in her credences or preferences.
(20)
Here’s the kind of case that is meant to motivate Stability, and show that views like
mine are in tension with it.
Suppose Stella is extremely conëdent that steel is stronger than Styrofoam,
but she’s not so conëdent that she’d bet her life on this proposition for
the prospect of winning a penny. PCR implies, implausibly, that if Stella
were oﬀered such a bet, she’d cease to believe that steel is stronger than
Styrofoam, since her credence would cease to rationalize acting as if this
proposition is true. (22)
Ross and Schroeder’s own view is that if Stella has a defeasible disposition to treat as true
the proposition that steel is stronger than Styrofoam, that’s enough for her to believe
it. And that can be true if the disposition is not only defeasible, but actually defeated
in the circumstances Stella is in. is all strikes me as just as implausible as the failure
of Stability. Let’s go over its costs.
e following propositions are clearly not mutually consistent, so one of them
must be given up. We’re assuming that Stella is facing, and knows she is facing, a bet
that pays a penny if steel is stronger than Styrofoam, and costs her life if steel is not
stronger than Styrofoam.
1. Stella believes that steel is stronger than Styrofoam.
2. Stella believes that if steel is stronger than Styrofoam, she’ll win a penny and lose
nothing by taking the bet.
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3. If 1 and 2 are true, and Stella considers the question of whether she’ll win a
penny and lose nothing by taking the bet, she’ll believe that she’ll win a penny
and lose nothing by taking the bet.
4. Stella prefers winning a penny and losing nothing to getting nothing.
5. If Stella believes that she’ll win a penny and lose nothing by taking the bet, and
prefers winning a penny and losing nothing to getting nothing, she’ll take the
bet.
6. Stella won’t take the bet.
It’s part of the setup of the problem that 2 and 4 are true. And it’s common ground
that 6 is true, at least assuming that Stella is rational. So we’re left with 1, 3 and 5 as
the possible candidates for falsehood.
Ross and Schroeder say that it’s implausible to reject 1. After all, Stella believed it a
fewminutes ago, and hasn’t received any evidence to the contrary. And I guess rejecting
1 isn’t the most intuitive philosophical conclusion I’ve ever drawn. But compare the
alternatives!
If we reject 3, we must say that Stella will simply refuse to infer r from p, q and
(p^q)! r . Now it is notoriously hard to come up with a general principle for closure
of beliefs. But it is hard to see why this particular instance would fail. And in any case,
it’s hard to see why Stella wouldn’t have a general, defeasible, disposition to conclude r
in this case, so by Ross and Schroeder’s own lights, it seems 3 should be acceptable.
at leaves 5. It seems on Ross and Schroeder’s view, Stella simply must violate a
very basic principle of means-end reasoning. She desires something, she believes that
taking the bet will get that thing, and come with no added costs. Yet, she refuses to
take the bet. And she’s rational to do so! At this stage, I think I’ve lost what’s meant
to be belief-like about their notion of belief. I certainly think attributing this kind
of practical incoherence to Stella is much less plausible than attributing a failure of
Stability to her.
Put another way, I don’t think presenting Stability on its own as a desideratum of
a theory is exactly playing fair. e salient question isn’t whether we should accept or
reject Stability. e salient question is whether giving up Stability is a fair price to pay
for saving basic tenets of means-end rationality. And I think that it is. Perhaps there
will be some way of understanding cases like Stella’s so that we don’t have to choose
between theories of belief that violate Stability constraints, and theories of belief that
violate coherence constraints. But I don’t see one on oﬀer, and I’m not sure what such
a theory could look like.
I have one more argument against Stability, but it does rest on somewhat con-
tentious premises. ere’s often a diﬀerence between the best methodology in an area,
and the correct epistemology of that area. When that happens, it’s possible that there
is a good methodological rule saying that if such-and-such happens, re-open a certain
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inquiry. But that rule need not be epistemologically signiëcant. at is, it need not be
the case that the happening of such-and-such provides evidence against the conclusion
of the inquiry. It just provides a reason that a good researcher will re-open the inquiry.
And, as we’ve stated above, an open inquiry is incompatible with belief.
Here’s one way that might happen. Like other non-conciliationists about disagree-
ment, e.g., Kelly (2010), I hold that disagreement by peers with the same evidence
as you doesn’t provide evidence that you are wrong. But it might provide an excellent
reason to re-open an inquiry. We shouldn’t draw conclusions about the methodolog-
ical signiëcance of disagreement from the epistemology of disagreement. So learning
that your peers all disagree with a conclusion might be a reason to re-open inquiry
into that conclusion, and hence lose belief in the conclusion, without providing evi-
dence that the conclusion is false. is example rests on a very contentious claim about
the epistemology of disagreement. But any gap that opens up between methodology
and epistemology will allow such an example to be constructed, and hence provide an
independent reason to reject Stability.
4 Conclusion
You might well worry that the view here is too complex to really be a theory of belief.
Belief is a simple state; why all the epicycles? is is a good question, and I’m not sure
I have a suﬃciently good answer to it.
At heart, the theory I’ve oﬀered here is simple. To believe p is to take p for granted,
to take it as given, to take it as a settled question. But one doesn’t take a question as
settled in a vacuum. I will take some questions as settled in some circumstances and
not others. It’s here that the complexities enter in.
To believe p, it isn’t necessary that we take it as settled in all contexts. at would
mean that anything one believes one would bet on at any odds. But it isn’t suﬃcient to
take it as settled in some context or other. If I’m facing a tricky bet on p, the fact that I’d
take p as settled in some other context doesn’t mean that I believe p. After all, I might
even decline the bet, although I desire the reward for winning the bet, and believe that
if p I will win. And we can’t just focus on the actual circumstances. Five minutes ago,
I neither took it as settled or as open that the Cubs haven’t won the World Series for
quite a while. I simply wasn’t thinking about that proposition, and didn’t really take it
to be one thing or another.
is is why things get so complex. To believe p is to hold a fairly simple attitude
towards p in some relevant circumstances. But which circumstances? at’s what’s
hard to say, and it’s why the theory is so messy. And I think we have an argument that
it must be a little hard to say, namely an argument by exhaustion of all the possible
simple things to say. e previous paragraph starts such an argument.
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I’d be a little surprised if the account here is the best or last word on the matter
though. It does feel a little disjunctive, as if there is a simpler reduction to be had. But
I think it’s better than what came before, so I’m putting it forward.
e previous version of the theory I put forward was clearly reductive; beliefs were
reduced to credences and preferences. is version is not quite as clearly reductive.
Which decision tables the agent is disposed to use, and which propositions those tables
encode, are not obviously facts about credences and preferences. So it feels like I’ve
given up on the reductive project.
I’m not altogether happy about this; reduction is a good aim to have. But if re-
duction of belief to other states fails, I’d think this kind of reason is why it is going to
fail. Facts about how an agent conceptualises a problem, how she sets up the decision
table, are distinct from facts about which values she writes into the table. is is the
deepest reason why the Lockean theory is false. Belief is not the diﬀerence between
one column in the decision table getting probability 0.98 rather than 0.97; it is the
diﬀerence between one column being excluded rather than included. If that diﬀerence
can’t be accounted for in terms of actual credences and preferences, the reductionist
project will fail.
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